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GUILBAUD'S 1952 THEOREM ON THE LOGICAL PROBLEM OF
AGGREGATION1
Daniel ECKERT2, Bernard MONJARDET3
résumé  Le théorème de Guilbaud de 1952 sur le problème logique de l'agrégation
Dans un article publié en 1952, peu après la publication du théorème d'impossibilité d'Arrow,
le mathématicien français Georges-Théodule Guilbaud a obtenu un résultat dictatorial pour
le problème logique de l'agrégation, anticipant ainsi la théorie abstraite de l'agrégation et
celle de l'agrégation des jugements. Nous donnons une reconstruction de la preuve
du théorème de Guilbaud, qui présente aussi un intérêt technique, puisqu'elle peut être
vue comme le premier emploi des ultraﬁltres en théorie du choix social.
mots clés  Agrégation, Agrégation des jugements, Connecteurs logiques, Jeu
simple, Ultraﬁltre
summary  In a paper published in 1952, shortly after publication of Arrow's cele-
brated impossibility result, the French mathematician Georges-Théodule Guilbaud has ob-
tained a dictatorship result for the logical problem of aggregation, thus anticipating the
literature on abstract aggregation theory and judgment aggregation. We reconstruct the
proof of Guilbaud's theorem, which is also of technical interest, because it can be seen as
the ﬁrst use of ultraﬁlters in social choice theory.
1A ﬁrst version of this paper was presented at the grand colloque de
l'ADRES New Developments in Social Choice and Welfare Theories: A Trib-
ute to Maurice Salles, June 10 - 12, 2009.
2Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Universität Graz, daniel.eckert@uni-
graz.at
3CES, Université Paris 1 and CAMS, EHESS, 54, boulevard Raspail 75270
Paris cedex 06, Bernard.Monjardet@univ-paris1.fr
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keywords  Aggregation, Judgment aggregation, Logical connectives, Simple
game, Ultraﬁlter
1 INTRODUCTION
In 1952, one year after the publication of Arrow's book Social choice and indi-
vidual values, the French mathematician Georges-Théodule Guilbaud (1912-
2008) published a paper called Les théories de l'intérêt général et le problème
logique de l'agrégation (Theories of the general interest and the logical prob-
lem of aggregation4). In our paper we will describe the historical background
of this paper that contained several sharp views on the problem of aggre-
gation [Monjardet, 2010]. But, we will concentrate on Guilbaud's logical
formalization of this problem and on his dictatorship result on the aggrega-
tion of logically interconnected propositions.
There are at least two reasons to come back to this not enough known
material. First, it appears as the ﬁrst attempt to build a general abstract
theory of aggregation based here on a logical approach. So, it preﬁgured
works like, one one hand those of Wilson [1975], Rubinstein and Fishburn
[1986] or Leclerc and Monjardet [1994], and, on the other hand those of
the theory of judgment aggregation [List, Puppe, 2009; List, Polak, 2010].
Second, it appears as the very ﬁrst application of an ultraﬁlter proof strategy
to get an Arrovian impossibility theorem. Then, it preﬁgures the use of such
a proof technique in works like those of Kirman and Sondermann [1972] or
Hansson [1976] in social choice theory [Monjardet 1983] or those more recent
of Gärdenfors [2006], Dietrich and Mongin [2010] (especially for the inﬁnite
case), Herzberg [2008] (for the use of ultraproducts), Daniels and Pacuit
[2009] or Klamler and Eckert [2009] (for a simple proof of a central result) in
judgment aggregation.
Unfortunately, Guilbaud gave only what he called an intuitive proof of
his main result (571, fn. 1/48, fn. 101)5. In the following two Sections we
4For an unabriged english translation of Guilbaud's paper see [Guilbaud,
2008], a drastically abridged translation [Guilbaud, 1966] had remained al-
most unnoticed [Monjardet, 2008(a)].
5In (571, fn. 1/48, fn. 101), 571 is the corresponding page in Guilbaud's
[1952] original paper, 48 the corresponding page in its english translation
[Guilbaud, 2008], and fn. 1 (respectively, 101) refers to footnote 1 (respec-
tively, 101).
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give a reconstruction of Guilbaud's main result and an explicit ultraﬁlter
proof of his theorem. Indeed, Guilbaud uses only implicitly the concept of
ultraﬁlter for reasons given in Section 4 where we provide historical details
on the genesis of his theorem. In Section 5 we set this theorem in the context
of the recent literature on judgment aggregation.
2 GUILBAUD'S THEOREM
Explicitly following the algebraic approach to logic underlying modern math-
ematical logic (534 ﬀ./23 ﬀ.), Guilbaud formulates the logical problem of
aggregation in the algebraic framework of binary valuations of a set of sen-
tences in propositional logic. In particular, he considers each individual
opinion as a system of judgments, that is, of aﬃrmations or negations, of ac-
ceptances or refusals, of a certain number of simple propositions (535/23).
Logical connections between these propositions directly translating into re-
strictions on the set of admissible valuations (537/25), Guilbaud identiﬁes
the logical problem of aggregation as the problem of ﬁnding a rule which
assigns to each proﬁle of individual opinions a logically consistent collec-
tive opinion, i.e. an admissible valuation. Thus, Guilbaud's approach is
entirely consistent with the literature on abstract aggregation theory (see
[Wilson, 1975], [Rubinstein, Fishburn, 1986] and, for a survey, [Day, McMor-
ris, 2003]), and on judgment aggregation (see especially [Dokow, Holzman,
2010]) in the framework of which it can easily be reconstructed. In fact,
Guilbaud can be seen as a precursor of both strands of literature as we will
show in the discussion in Section 5.
Let P = {p1, . . . , pj, . . . , pm} be an indexed set of m sentences in proposi-
tional logic, which constitutes the agenda of the collective decision problem.
For simplicity, the agenda will be identiﬁed with the index set {1, ..., j, ...,m}
of issues and a proposition pj will be identiﬁed with the j-th issue. A
valuation of the agenda P is a map P → {0, 1} which assigns a truth
value to any proposition in the agenda. Algebraically, it is thus a vector
x = (x1, ..., xj, ..., xm) ∈ {0, 1}P .
Given a set N = {1, ..., i, ..., n} of individuals, a proﬁle is a map N →
{0, 1}P and it is denoted by x = (x1, ..., xi, ..., xn) ∈ ({0, 1}P )N , where, for
every i ∈ N , xi = (xi1, ...xij, ..., xim) is the valuation of P by individual i.
An aggregation rule is then a map f :
({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P .
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Clearly, if the propositions in the agenda are logically interconnected,
not all valuations are admissible (logically consistent). E.g. for an agenda
P = {p1, p2} where p1 implies p2 the valuation (1, 0) is inadmissible. In fact
to deﬁne logical connections between the propositions of an agenda P comes
back to deﬁne the setX ⊆ {0, 1}P of admissible valuations of the propositions
in P . In particular, as is familiar from the use of truth tables, the sixteen
elements of the power set of {0, 1}2 deﬁne the sixteen logical connections
between two propositions p1 and p2. E.g. the set X = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}
of admissible valuations deﬁnes precisely the material implication p1 → p2.
For a given agenda P , the subdomain of admissible valuations X ⊆
{0, 1}P is closed under the aggregation rule f if f(XN) ⊆ X, that is if
the aggregation rule does not assign an inadmissible collective valuation to a
proﬁle of admissible individual valuations. Guilbaud calls Condorcet Eﬀect
(537/25) the fact that a particular subdomain may not be closed under the
aggregation rule. Then, and in particular under majority voting, the collec-
tive outcome may be an inadmissible valuation, i.e. a valuation which could
not have been the opinion of any one (565/44). Thus, Guilbaud formulates
his logical problem of aggregation as the problem of identifying those ag-
gregation rules which guarantee closure of relevant subdomains, i.e. domains
that correspond to an agenda of logically interconnected propositions (the
domain X = {0, 1}P corresponding to an agenda of logically completely in-
dependent propositions being trivially closed under any aggregation rule). In
particular, an aggregation rule is called acceptable by Guilbaud (559/40),
if for every agenda P the corresponding subdomain of admissible valuations
X ⊆ {0, 1}P is closed.
Similarly to the social choice literature, Guilbaud stresses the signiﬁcance
of independence and neutrality conditions for aggregation rules. In fact, he
claims that the collective valuation of any issue should only depend on the
individual valuations of that issue and that this pattern of dependence should
be the same for all issues, a property known as systematicity in the literature
on judgment aggregation.
However, unlike Arrow in his formulation of the condition of independence
of irrelevant alternatives, Guilbaud does not justify these invariance proper-
ties by the requirement that the availability of a third alternative should not
alter the choice between any two alternatives but rather justiﬁes the strong
condition of systematicity by the second order problem of collectively identi-
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fying and establishing any relevant additional information to the individual
valuations of a given issue. In Guilbaud's view, this implicitly deﬁnes new
issues and thus, requires the introduction of additional 'ideal' voters (. . . )
whose task is to qualify the ballot by their answers (569/46).
Let x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N be a proﬁle, j an issue and v ∈ {0, 1} a truth value;
the subset of individuals
xj(v) := {i ∈ N : xij = v}
is the set of individuals that assign the valuation v to the issue j. Denoting
for any aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P by fj the j-th component
of f , i.e. the function fj : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1} that assigns to any proﬁle
of individual valuations the social valuation of the issue j, the following
invariance conditions can be deﬁned.
definition 1. An aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P is independent
if for any issue j ∈ P , any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}, and for all proﬁles x, x′ ∈
({0, 1}P )N
fj(x) = v ⇒
[
xj(v) = x
′
j(v)⇒ fj(x′) = v
]
.
An aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P is neutral if for all issues
k, l ∈ P ,
fk = fl.
An aggregation rule is systematic if it is independent and neutral, i.e.
if for all issues k, l ∈ P , any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}, and for all proﬁles
x, x′ ∈ ({0, 1}P )N
fk(x) = v ⇒ [xk(v) = x′l(v)⇒ fl(x′) = v] .
Independence means that the social valuation of any given issue only
depends on the individual valuations of the very same issue. Systematicity
makes the further neutrality requirement that this pattern of dependence be
the same for all issues.
Given an aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P , let us say that
a subset of individuals U = xj(v) is a winning coalition for the issue
j ∈ P , the valuation v ∈ {0, 1} and the proﬁle x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N if fj(x) = v.
Then, observe that when the aggregation rule f is independent the set U is
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also a winning coalition for j, v and any proﬁle x′ ∈ ({0, 1}P )N such that
x′j(v) = xj(v). Thus, an independent aggregation rule can be characterised
by identifying for any issue j ∈ P and any valuation v ∈ {0, 1} the family
Wvj = {U ∈ 2N : xj(v) = U ⇒ fj(x) = v}, i.e. the family of all coalitions
that are winning for a given issue and a given valuation. One says that these
families of winning coalitions are induced by the aggregation rule f .
Observe that for any issue j ∈ P , the families W1j and W0j are co-dual
in the sense that for any valuation v ∈ {0, 1} and any coalition U ∈ 2N ,
U ∈ Wvj if and only if N\U /∈ W1−vj .
Systematicity then simply translates into the condition Wvk =Wvl =Wv
for all issues k, l ∈ P and any given valuation v ∈ {0, 1}. So, when the
aggregation rule f is systematic, there exists two families W0 and W1 of
subsets of N such that for any issue j ∈ P , for any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}, and
for any proﬁle x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N ,
fj(x) = v if and only if xj(v) ∈ Wv.
In other words, a winning coalition for a valuation v ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. a member
of Wv, is a winning coalition for any issue.
The central part of Guilbaud's argumentation consists in showing how
the acceptability condition of closure of all the subdomains of admissible
valuations under an aggregation rule translates into conditions on its induced
families of winning coalitions, which ultimately amount to a dictatorship.
definition 2. An aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P is dictatorial
(or is a dictatorship) if there exists an individual i ∈ N such that Wvk =
Wvl = {U ∈ 2N : i ∈ U} for all issues k, l ∈ P and any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}.
Observe that this deﬁnition is equivalent to the usual one in terms of
the projection of the space of proﬁles on one of its components, i.e. the
characteristics of a particular individual, which then is the dictator
One can now state Guilbaud's theorem:
theorem 1 (Guilbaud, 1952). A systematic aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N →
{0, 1}P for an agenda with more than a single pair of propositions is accept-
able (i.e. for any X ⊆ {0, 1}P X is closed under f) if and only if it is
dictatorial.
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We will give Guilbaud's proof of this theorem below. For his demon-
stration Guilbaud establishes and proves several results about the induced
families of winning coalitions. In particular, he establishes the following
properties of winning coalitions for systematic aggregation rules.
definition 3. A coalition U ∈ 2N is eﬃcient if U ∈ W v implies U ∈ W 1−v
for any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. if it is winning for both valuations of any
issue.
The fact that the winning coalitions induced by systematic aggregation
rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P are eﬃcient means that W0 = W1 = W , i.e.
that such a rule is given for any issue j ∈ P , any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}, and
for any proﬁle x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N by
fj(x) = v if and only if xj(v) ∈ W .
The other important property of winning coalitions shown by Guilbaud is
their monotonicity property of closure under supersets. Since this property
characterises the families of coalitions known as simple games, it allows Guil-
baud to explicitly apply this concept to the analysis of acceptable systematic
aggregation rules6. Guilbaud shows also other properties  given below  of
the simple games induced by systematic aggregation rules.
definition 4. A simple game on the set N of individuals is a collection
W ⊆ 2N of subsets of N such that for all U, V ∈ 2N ,
if U ∈ W and U ⊂ V , then V ∈ W.
A simple game is proper if for any U ∈ 2N , U ∈ W ⇒ N\U /∈ W.
A simple game is strong if for any U ∈ 2N , U /∈ W ⇒ N\U ∈ W.
Finally, when a (systematic) aggregation rule is deﬁned by a set of (eﬃ-
cient) winning coalitions forming a proper and strong simple game Guilbaud
says that it is a rule of majority in the broad sense (561/41), as it gen-
eralizes the partition of the sets of coalitions into winning and non-winning
coalitions that any majority threshold establishes. Intuitively, this is also the
6Guilbaud quotes von Neumann and Morgenstern's [1944] book where sim-
ple games are deﬁned. Observe nevertheless that von Neumann and Morgen-
stern's deﬁnition corresponds to what is now called a proper and strong
simple game, and excludes what they call the trivial case where
W = {U ∈ 2N : i ∈ U} for some i ∈ N , i.e. precisely a dictatorial situation.
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reason for the applicability of the ultraﬁlter concept which aims precisely at
partitioning a power set into large and small subsets.
Guilbaud establishes his theorem with the help of the following lemma:
lemma 1 (Guilbaud, 1952). A systematic aggregation rule is acceptable for
any pair of propositions {k, l} ⊆ P and for any agenda P if and only if it
is a rule of majority in the broad sense, i.e. if there exists a proper and
strong simple game W ⊆ 2N such that for any issue j ∈ {k, l}, any valuation
v ∈ {0, 1} and any proﬁle x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N
fj(x) = v if and only if {i ∈ N : xij = v} ∈ W.
In order to prove this lemma Guilbaud ﬁrst observes that since the ag-
gregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1}P is systematic, i.e. the function
fj : ({0, 1}P )N → {0, 1} does not depend on the valuation of other issues
than j and is the same for each issue j ∈ P , it is suﬃcient to consider a
single function from {0, 1}N into {0, 1} which, in a slight abuse of notation,
we still denote by f .
Guilbaud proves his lemma by establishing necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for the preservation of any logical connection between two propositions
p1 and p2 by a systematic aggregation rule. He starts by considering the four
logical connectives which are determined by all the three element subsets of
the power set of {0, 1}2. These are the material implication (for which (1, 0)
is inadmissible), the converse implication (for which (0, 1) is inadmissible),
the alternative denial (NAND) and the disjunction (for which (1, 1) resp.
(0, 0) are inadmissible).
Beginning with the material implication, Guilbaud establishes a neces-
sary and suﬃcient condition for the preservation of the implication p1 → p2,
i.e. the exclusion of the inadmissible valuation (1, 0). Observe that if the
valuation (1, 0) is inadmissible, this implies for all proﬁles of admissible val-
uations x ∈ XN = [{0, 1}2\(1, 0)]N that x1(1) = {i ∈ N : xi1 = 1} ⊆ x2(1) =
{i ∈ N : xi2 = 1}.
Thus the exclusion of the inadmissible valuation (1, 0) requires the avoid-
ance of the following coincidence ("rencontre des deux faits", 558/39) for any
proﬁle x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N
(1) x1(1) ⊆ x2(1)
(2) f1(x) = 1 and f2(x) = 0, or equivalently, given independence, x1(1) ∈
W1 and x2(0) ∈ W0.
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Hence, Guilbaud establishes as a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
the preservation of the implication p1 → p2 the following for all proﬁles
x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N :
If x1(1) ∈ W1 and x2(0) ∈ W0 then x1(1) * x2(1),
or, still by independence, and for any coalition W ∈ 2N ,
if W ∈ W1, then W * N\V for all V ∈ W0.
Given the correspondence between logical connectives and sets of admis-
sible valuations X ⊆ {0, 1}2, it is straightforward to see (559, fn. 1/39,
fn. 89) that to preserve any logical connection between two propositions
comes back to satisfy the following condition for the exclusion of any val-
uation {v, v′} ∈ {0, 1}2 in the corresponding set of inadmissible valuations
{0, 1}2\X:
General exclusion condition. For any inadmissible valuation (v, v′) ∈
{0, 1}2 and any proﬁle x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N , if x1(v) ∈ Wv and x2(v′) ∈ Wv′ , then
x1(v) * x2(1− v′),
or, by independence, and for any coalition W ∈ 2N ,
if W ∈ Wv, then W * N\V for all V ∈ Wv′ .
This exclusion condition is thus a necessary and suﬃcient condition in
order that a systematic aggregation rule preserves all the logical connections
between two propositions.
The application of this exclusion condition together with other properties
readily establishes the following properties of winning coalitions:
To show that all winning coalitions must be eﬃcient (559 f./40), Guilbaud
considers two propositions such that p1 ↔ ¬p2 and the corresponding valua-
tions are contradictory, i.e. x1(v) = x2(1− v) for any valuation v ∈ {0, 1}
and for any proﬁle x ∈ ({0, 1}P )N . Clearly, by the exclusion condition, if
x1(v) = x2(1 − v) ∈ Wv then N\x2(1 − v) /∈ Wv and hence by co-duality
x2(1− v) = x1(v) ∈ W1−v, i.e. any winning coalition for a valuation v is also
winning for the valuation 1− v.
Guilbaud then proceeds to show that the family W =W1 = W0 of ef-
ﬁcient coalitions is closed under supersets, i.e. that W is a simple game
(560/40). This follows from the exclusion condition by an easy proof by con-
tradiction: Assume to the contrary that for some winning coalition W ∈ W
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there exists a superset U of W which is not a winning coalition (i.e. W ⊂ U ,
but U /∈ W, and hence N\U ∈ W). The exclusion condition now requires
that N\U * N\W which contradicts the assumption that W ⊂ U .
Finally, it follows from eﬃciency together with co-duality that the induced
family of winning coalitions is a strong and proper simple game (561/41).
Now, to show that an acceptable systematic aggregation rule for an
agenda with at least three propositions is dictatorial, it suﬃces to show that
the strong and simple game W induced by such an aggregation rule has the
form W = {U ∈ 2N : i ∈ U} for some individual i ∈ N  the dictator.
This is done by Guilbaud by identifying an essential condition for the
acceptability of a systematic aggregation rule, the violation of which is re-
sponsible for the Condorcet eﬀect:
definition 5. A collection W ⊆ 2N satisﬁes the intersecting triple prop-
erty if for all U, V,W ∈ W, U ∩ V ∩W 6= ∅.
Observe that this property is equivalent to the condition that the Naka-
mura number7 of the collection W be strictly larger than three [Monjardet,
2003].
This condition is also intuitively very plausible as its violation directly
leads to the Condorcet eﬀect, i.e. to a social outcome that cannot be the
valuation of any single individual because it is inadmissible.
Guilbaud proves his theorem in three steps (565-567/43-45):
(i) The family W of winning coalitions satisﬁes the intersecting triple prop-
erty.
Indeed, consider any inadmissible valuation (vk, vl, vm) of three propo-
sitions pk, pl, pm ∈ P . Unless this intersection property holds, one can
take three coalitions with empty intersection and construct a proﬁle such
that {xk(vk), xl(vl), xm(vm)} ⊆ W leading to the inadmissible valuation
(vk, vl, vm).
(ii) The family W is closed under intersection.
First, by the intersecting triple property, the intersection of any two win-
ning coalitions is non empty. Now if the intersection of two winning coalitions
7The Nakamura number of a collection W ⊆ 2N of subsets of N is the
cardinality of the smallest subset of W with empty intersection.
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U, V ∈ W is not a winning coalition, its complement N\U∩V must be a win-
ning coalition, which in turn implies the existence of three winning coalitions
with empty intersection U ∩ V ∩ (N\U ∩ V ) = ∅, a contradiction.
iii) The family of winning coalitions has the form W = {U ∈ 2N : i ∈ U} for
some individual i ∈ N , - the dictator.
Since W is closed under intersection, the intersection ⋂
W∈W
W of all the
winning coalitions is a winning coalition and it is the minimal winning coali-
tion. Assume that
⋂
W∈W
W is not a singleton and thus contains a proper subset
S ⊂ ⋂
W∈W
W . But this implies N\S ∈ W and hence ( ⋂
W∈W
W ) ∩ (N\S) =⋂
W∈W
(W\S) ∈ W by intersection closure. Thus, ⋂
W∈W
W cannot be a minimal
winning coalition unless it is a singleton, which completes the proof of dicta-
torship of any acceptable aggregation rule for an agenda with at least three
propositions.
3 A SIMPLE ULTRAFILTRER PROOF OF GUILBAUD'S THE-
OREM
Guilbaud's own proof only implicitly uses the concept of ultraﬁlter and we
will see in section 4 why he did not explicitly use it. In the following we give
an explicit and simple ultraﬁlter proof of his theorem. We begin by recalling
some deﬁnitions.
definition 6. A ﬁlter on a set N is a collection W ⊆ 2N of subsets of N
such that
(i) N ∈ W and ∅ /∈ W (non-triviality)
(ii) if U ∈ W and V ∈ F then U ∩ V ∈ W (closure under intersection)
(iii) if U ∈ W and U ⊂ V then V ∈ W (closure under supersets).
A ﬁlter W on N is a principal ﬁlter if it is a collection W = {U ∈ 2N :
S ⊆ U} for some non-empty subset S of N .
An ultraﬁlter is a maximal ﬁlter, i.e. a ﬁlter not strictly contained in an-
other ﬁlter.
It is clear that on a ﬁnite set N every ﬁlter is principal and that in
particular it follows that every ultraﬁlter is a collection W = {U ∈ 2N :
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i ∈ U} for some i ∈ N  which immediately yields a dictatorship result for
families of winning coalitions.
By the monotonicity property of closure under supersets a ﬁlter is also
a simple game, which allows to use Monjardet's [1978] characterization of
ultraﬁlters8 to obtain the following lemma.
lemma 2 (Monjardet, 2003). If a family W of subsets of a set N is a strong
simple game which satisﬁes the intersecting triple property, it is an ultraﬁlter.
This yields a particularly simple ultraﬁlter proof of Guilbaud's theorem.
Proof. From Guilbaud's lemma we know that a family W ⊆ 2N of winning
coalitions which is induced by an acceptable aggregation rule is a strong
and proper simple game on N . But for a systematic aggregation rule to be
acceptable for an agenda with at least three propositions, its induced family
of winning coalitions also needs to satisfy the intersecting triple property,
and thus, by Monjardet's lemma, is an ultraﬁlter. Finally, as N is ﬁnite, W
is a principal ultraﬁlter and thus has the form {U ⊆ N : i ∈ U} for some
i ∈ N  the dictator.
4 HISTORICAL NOTE
We will succesively examine three points: the genesis of Guilbaud's 1952 pa-
per, the genesis of Guilbaud's theorem on judgment aggregation, its relation
to Arrow's theorem and the origins of the ultraﬁlter proofs in social choice
theory.
Guilbaud's theorem on judgment aggregation is contained in his paper
Les théories de l'intérêt général et le problème logique de l'agrégation (Theo-
ries of the general interest and the logical problem of aggregation). In order
to understand the genesis of this paper we must put together some biograph-
ical and scientiﬁc facts9. Guilbaud, after his studies of mathematics at the
8Monjardet [1978] shows that a collection W ⊆ 2N of subsets of N is
an ultraﬁlter if and only if it satisﬁes the intersecting triple property and
the property that for any U ∈ 2N , U /∈ W ⇒ N\U ∈ W . Observe that
for collections which are simple games the latter property deﬁnes a strong
simple game.
9Guilbaud died in 2008 and a special issue of Mathématiques et Sciences
humaines 183, 2008, contains his biography and his publications (URL:
http://www.ehess.fr/revue-msh/recherche.php?numero=183).
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École Normale Supérieure (1932-1935), was ﬁrst teacher of in classes of high
mathematics10 at Metz, Brest then Dijon (1941-1947). From 1942 to 1947
he also did lectures on the philosophy of sciences at the  Faculté des let-
tres et sciences humaines  of Dijon. Guilbaud was interested in the use of
mathematics in Economics and more generally in Social Sciences. So he read
classics like Condorcet, Cournot or Pareto. Gilles-Gaston Granger comes at
Dijon in 1943 as professor of philosophy and both begin a friendship where
in particular they speak about Condorcet's  Mathématique Sociale 11. In
1947 Guilbaud becomes member of the  Institut des Sciences Économiques
Appliquées (ISEA)  of François Perroux where he works as mathematician,
statistician and economist up to 1955. Arrow sends him a preprint of his 1951
book Social Choice and Individual Values. Guilbaud is surprised to see that
Arrow doesn't know that the voting paradox is due to Condorcet. Mean-
while, Arrow is invited by Perroux at the ISEA to make a presentation of his
work. His lecture entitled The rationality principle in collective decisions is
given on June 1952 and is published in a special issue of Économie appliquée12
devoted to welfare economics and called L'avantage collectif. Guilbaud's pa-
per  certainly motivated by Arrow's coming  is in this same issue.
This paper contains many interesting results and perspectives on aggre-
gation problems13. In particular, Guilbaud dragged from the deep oblivion
where it had fallen Condorcet's Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la prob-
abilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (Paris, 1785)14. Indeed,
the Essai had been read only by a few contemporaries including the mathe-
maticians Sylvestre-Francois Lacroix and Simon Lhuilier or the politician and
historian Pierre Claude Francois Daunou. But later in France reputed math-
ematicians like Joseph Louis Francois Bertrand in his Calcul des probabilités
10These classes prepare students for the competitive examinations
allowing the entrance in a  Grande École  like the École Polytechnique
or the École Normale Supérieure.
11Granger writes in the introduction of his book La mathématique sociale du
marquis de Condorcet (Paris, 1956) and which was his Thèse complémentaire
pour le doctorat ès lettres :  Je dois à mon collègue et ami G.-Th. Guilbaud,
outre des suggestions toujours fécondes, l'idée même d'étudier Condorcet 
(p. x).
12Économie appliquée 5(4): 469-484 (October-December 1952).
13An analysis of this paper can be found in [Monjardet, 2005].
14For a partial english translation with an introduction into Condorcet's
work see [Condorcet, 1994].
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(Paris, 1888/89) found the book unreadable and anyway without interest,
an opinion shared by the main 19th century historian of mathematics Isaac
Todhunter who at least had read the Essai15. Guilbaud was the ﬁrst to read
again the Essai and to understand the logical problem raised by Condorcet
through his sometimes enough confuse probabilistic approach.
Indeed, Condorcet's aim in the Essai is to ﬁnd the method which maxi-
mizes the probability to get the truth when a collectivity must determine it
by a voting procedure. The truth can be the culpability or not of a defendant
when the collectivity is a court or the best candidate when the collectivity is
a recruitment jury. In such cases, the voters must give what Condorcet calls
an opinion ( avis ) on the decision to take. According to Condorcet this
opinion can and must always be decomposed in a sequence of answers TRUE
or FALSE to binary propositions (equivalently, in a sequence of answers YES
or NO to binary questions)16. For instance, in the case of candidates, the
opinion of a voter can be a (strict) ranking of the candidates and it is decom-
posed in a sequence of answers to the questions: is candidate A better than
candidate B? Now, Condorcet argues that the collective decision must be
obtained by taking the opinion resulting of the majority decisions obtained
on each question. And he shows a ﬁrst paradox: this opinion is not neces-
sarily the opinion obtained by the plurality (i.e. the opinion obtaining the
greatest number of votes). In fact  en prenant la décision à la pluralité entre
les avis à la manière ordinaire, on pourrait adopter l'avis de la minorité 
(by taking the decision between the opinions by the usual plurality method,
it would be possible to adopt the minority opinion, Essai, p. 115). On the
other hand, Condorcet observes that the propositions can be linked like in
the following example where they are incompatible (Essai, Discours prélim-
inaire, p. 50-51): the ﬁrst proposition is p =  il est prouvé que l'accusé est
coupable  and the second is q =  il est prouvé que l'accusé est innocent .
Now, Condorcet assumes that there are 11 opinions `p and nonq', 7 opinions
15In his book A history of the mathematical theory of probability from the
time of Pascal to that of Laplace (London, 1865) Todhunter devotes a chapter
to a detailed analysis of the Essai but he completely misses the signiﬁcance
of Condorcet's study on the systems of propositions and their possible con-
tradictions (these results however appear of too little value to detain us any
longer, p. 375).
16Condorcet's formulation is :  chaque avis est une combinaison de propo-
sitions simples et de leurs contradictoires  (Essai, Discours préliminaire, p.
45).
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`nonp and q' and 6 opinions `nonp and nonq'. In this case the opinion hav-
ing the plurality is `p and nonq', whereas the opinion obtained by using the
majority rule on each of the two propositions is `nonp and nonq'.
In the case of preferences agregation Condorcet's majority method used
on each pairwise comparison between two alternatives leads him to discover
the Condorcet eﬀect (the paradox of voting): the binary majority prefer-
ences do not necessarily yield a ranking, they may lead to a cycle. Now,
Guilbaud observes that the problem is more general and has been already
encountered for instance in the case of Quetelet's  homme moyen 17. The
problem occurs each time that one applies  like Condorcet  a component-
wise method of aggregation of complex objects. It consists ﬁrst of decom-
posing complex objects into their simple elements, then of applying to each
series of such elements an aggregation operator like the mean or the median
(the majority rule comes back to take a median). By deﬁnition an essential
property of this method is its property of independence: each series of simple
elements is aggregated (by the same or by diﬀerent operators) independently
of the other series. Now as soon as the complex objects considered satisfy
some relations between their simple elements, the aggregated complex object
does not necessarily satisfy these same relations.18 In the case of preference
aggregation, Arrow proved that the apparition of Condorcet eﬀects is un-
avoidable in the sense that in order to avoid it one must take a dictatorial
aggregation procedure or sacrify another desirable property of the aggrega-
tion rule. It is certainly the reading of the Essai and of Arrow's result that
motivated Guilbaud to consider a more general framework and then to get his
dictatorship result on the aggregation of valuations for a set of propositions.
However, Guilbaud does not make the claim that his theorem is stronger than
Arrow's. In fact, he is well aware that his joint assumption of independence
and neutrality is stronger than the Arrovian independence condition, and
makes much eﬀort to justify it. But above all, his acceptability condition is
even the strongest possible domain condition19 and thus much stronger than
17See Guilbaud's paper or [Monjardet, 2005] for details.
18One can observe that it is exactly this situation which happens in the
so-called doctrinal paradox (see the following section). Here one has sev-
eral propositions logically linked and that judges  respecting these links 
can ﬁnd true or false. But when one takes the majority answers to each
proposition it is possible to get a result not satisfying the logical links.
19In fact, it is possible to strengthen signiﬁcantly Guilbaud's theorem by
considerably weakening his acceptability condition as we will show in a forth-
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the Arrovian condition of universal domain which is still restricted to prefer-
ences, i.e. to the particular subdomain of admissible valuations for pairwise
rankings between alternatives in the case of weak orderings.
On the other hand, Arrow acknowledged Guilbaud's 1952 paper as a re-
markable exposition of the theory of collective choice and the general problem
of aggregation in the second edition of his book [Arrow, 1963, p. 92]. He
even seemed ready to consider the pairwise acceptability condition in lemma
1 as a relaxation of his weak ordering requirement of collective rationality, as
the following quotation suggests: Guilbaud weakens the condition [of Collec-
tive Rationality] to require simply avoiding contradictions on two successive
decisions (rather than three, when the full force of transitivity comes into
play). He then conducts the bulk of his analysis under the assumption that
the decision rule between any two alternatives be the same [Arrow, 1962, p.
100].
This quotation could let think that one can deduce Arrow's theorem from
Guilbaud's theorem, what is untrue. But, what is true is that one can use
Guilbaud's method of proof to get short proofs of Arrow's theorem [Mon-
jardet, 1969, 1978, 2003].
In the proof of his theorem Guilbaud does not use the term ultraﬁlter.
But it suﬃces to read his proof to see that followers of Bourbaki will notice
an ultraﬁlter in the background as Blau [1979, p. 202] would have said and
as it was observed by Monjardet [1969, p. 180]:  Il est alors immédiat que
dans l'algèbre de Boole des parties de N, la famille [des ensembles décisifs]
doit être un ﬁltre maximal  (then it is immediate that in the Boolean
algebra of subsets of N, the family [of decisive sets] must be a maximal
ﬁlter). In handwritten notes concerning his 1952 paper sent to one of us
Guilbaud explains: I could have pointed out Henri Cartan's ﬁlters20. But
ﬁrstly I have found this allusion too pompous and secondly for Cartan the
ﬁlters were a mean to get rid of 'the plague of countable'. So, it concerns
essentially the inﬁnite, what was out of the topic.
It is interesting to observe that the rediscovery of the use of ultraﬁlter
in the proof of Arrow's theorem occured precisely after that Fishburn [1970]
coming paper.
20Henri Cartan was the creator of the notion of ﬁlter. See his two 1937
Comptes rendus à l'Académie des Sciences de Paris,  Théorie des ﬁltres 
(205, p. 595-598) and  Filtres et ultraﬁltres  (205, p. 777-779).
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.56
guilbaud's theorem on the logical problem of aggregation 21
noticed that the dictatorship result does not hold in the case of an inﬁnite
population of voters (assuming the Axiom of Choice): Then Hansson [1976]
in a paper written in 1971, and Kirman and Sondermann [1972] gave an ul-
traﬁlter proof of Arrow's theorem by showing that the collection of decisive
coalitions induced by a social welfare function satisfying Arrow's other ax-
ioms is an ultraﬁlter. The dictatorship result then immediately follows from
the well-known fact that an ultraﬁlter on a ﬁnite set is principal, i.e. the
collection of all supersets of some singleton. After this rediscovery ultraﬁlter
proofs were often used for impossibility (or possibility) theorems in social
choice theory and in the recent literature on judgment aggregation.
5 JUDGEMENT AGGREGATION AND GUILBAUD'S THE-
OREM
Interestingly, the recent literature on judgment aggregation originates in a
paradox which arises in the same legal context of aggregating the opinions of
a court of several judges into a collective decision that motivated Condorcet's
analysis: the doctrinal paradox [Kornhauser, Sager, 1986]. This paradox owes
its name to the logical connections between the issues established by legal
doctrine: In particular, in a contract case a defendant is liable (L) if and only
if there was a valid contract (C) and a material breach (B) of that contract.
Thus, the verdict L is equivalent to the conjunction of two propositions.
How easily majority voting can lead to a logically inconsistent outcome
is seen from the following table21:
C B L
Judge 1 1 1 1
Judge 2 0 1 0
Judge 3 1 0 0
Court 1 1 0
In fact, the ﬁrst theorem in the literature on judgment aggregation by List
and Pettit [2002] is a straightforward generalization of the doctrinal paradox.
21In fact, the legal literature on the doctrinal paradox was more interested
in the discrepancy between the outcome of majority voting on the premises
and the outcome of majority voting on the conclusion.
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This theorem was originally not formulated in the framework of binary valua-
tions, but of the aggregation of judgment sets and uses the stronger property
of anonymity instead of non-dictatorship.22
theorem 2 (List, Pettit, 2002). If for two atomic propositions pk, pl the
set {pk,¬pk, pl,¬pl, pk ∧ pl,¬(pk ∧ pl)} is a subset of the agenda P (where
∧ could be replaced by ∨ or →), there exists no systematic and anonymous
aggregation rule f : XN → {0, 1}P such that the subdomain X ⊆ {0, 1}P of
admissible valuations of the agenda P is closed.
Observe that an equivalent formulation of Guilbaud's theorem is that
there exists no systematic and non-dictatorial aggregation rule f : ({0, 1}P )N →
{0, 1}P under which the subdomain X ⊆ {0, 1}P of admissible valuations for
any agenda P is closed.
Although the non-dictatorship property used by Guilbaud is weaker than
the property of anonymity used in List and Pettit's impossibility theorem,
Guilbaud's theorem cannot be considered to be stronger, because his accept-
ability condition is the strongest possible agenda condition: it requires the
closure of the subdomain of admissible valuations for any agenda.
Thus the signiﬁcance of Guilbaud's theorem does not consist in the strength
of the result, but in the strength and originality of his approach: Long before
Wilson [1975, p. 89] asked the question whether procedures for aggregat-
ing attributes other than preferences are subject to similar restrictions than
Arrow's theorem, which initiated the literature on abstract aggregation the-
ory, and even longer before the recent literature on judgment aggregation
Guilbaud generalized Arrow's theorem to the logical problem of aggrega-
tion. Like Rubinstein and Fishburn [1986] for abstract aggregation theory
and later Dokow and Holzman [2010] for judgment aggregation he formu-
lated this problem in an algebraic framework. But above all, he addressed
this problem with the powerful tools of ultraﬁlters long before they were even
used in the theory of preference aggregation.
22For the below reformulation of this theorem in the framework of proposi-
tional valuations (as well as for a generalization of it) see Pauly and van Hees
[2006]. The properties of completeness, consistency, and deductive closure
deﬁned for individual and collective judgment sets, i.e. subsets of a set P
of propositions then directly translate into the condition that the domain of
admissible valuations X ⊆ {0, 1}P be closed under the aggregation rule.
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A classical escape route from Arrovian impossibility results consists in
domain restrictions. For particular domain restrictions it can be shown that
majority rule never induces a Condorcet eﬀect. Dietrich and List [2010] pro-
vide several domain restrictions that guarantee logically consistent judgments
under majority rule. In particular, they show that one can get such domains
when the (set of propositions of the) agenda is linearly ordered. This result is
similar to Black's single-peakedness condition in preference aggregation. In
his paper, Guilbaud devotes several pages (540ﬀ/26ﬀ) to a study of this last
condition. He shows that this comes back to deﬁne a (partial) order on the
set of the pairwise comparisons x > y and that the linear orders satisfying
Black's condition correspond to the up-sets of this order. So by Birkhoﬀ's
duality between posets and distributive lattices the set of these linear orders
is a distributive lattice. But since (as it is or it should be well-known that)
majority rule coincides with the median operation in a distributive lattice,
the set of these linear orders is closed under majority rule.23 In this way,
Guilbaud's remarks on Black's condition also anticipated the main domain
restriction in preference aggregation. Indeed, almost all restricted domains
are distributive lattices deﬁned from particular partial orders on the pair-
wise comparisons [Galambos, Reiner, 2008; Monjardet, 2008(b)]. Moreover,
it is easy to see that Guilbaud's observation can be extended to judgment
aggregation. As soon as there exists a partial order on the agenda, the set of
admissible valuations corresponds to the distributive lattice of the down-sets
of this poset and then majority rule always provides an admissible valuation.
6 CONCLUSION
In 1952, almost immediately after the publication of Arrow's seminal book in
1951, the French mathematician Georges-Théodule Guilbaud published an
article in a special issue of the French review Économie Appliquée dedicated
to welfare economics which anticipated both the use of ultraﬁlters in social
choice theory and the more recent attempts to extend this area from the the-
ory of preference aggregation to abstract aggregation theory and judgment
aggregation in particular. This article published in French remained almost
unnoticed, although Arrow himself acknowledged it as a remarkable exposi-
tion of the theory of collective choice and the general problem of aggregation
23See, for instance, [Hudry et al., 2009] for the link between majority rule
and the median operation in distributive lattices.
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in the second edition of his book [Arrow, 1963, p. 92]. This phenomenon de-
serves further investigation as a case of multiple discoveries due to language
barriers24, but interestingly not even a partial translation of this article in
1966 was able to attract due attention25. This might be seen as evidence for
deeper barriers impeding scientiﬁc communication even in highly formalized
areas of the social sciences.
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